

THE  
S P E E C H  
OF  
JOHN NICHOLLS, ESQ. *K*  
IN THE  
HOUSE OF COMMONS,  
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 3, 1798,  
ON THE  
*BILL FOR AUGMENTING*  
THE  
ASSESSED TAXES.

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1798.

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## S P E E C H, &c.

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*Mr. Speaker,*

**I** Have not yet heard an answer, to any one of the objections, which have been made to this tax.

The first objection made to this tax, was, that it was unequal, and therefore unjust. It is unequal in the manner in which it affects the different classes of society; it is also unequal in the manner in which it affects different individuals in the same class. The man of 1,000l. a year, will pay one tenth, while the man of 10,000l. a year will frequently pay only one twentieth of his income. This inequality becomes greater in proportion as the difference of income is increased.—Compare the situation of the man of 500l. a year, and that of the man of 20,000l. a year, you will find that the man of 500l. a year will frequently pay one seventh, (except he relieves himself by swearing off,) while the man of 20,000l. a year, will pay no more than one twenty-fifth. Now, Sir, this inequality is the



very reverse of what it ought to be ; a tax of 2,000l. on a man of 20,000l. a year, is more easily supported, than a tax of 50l. on a man of 500l. a year. The man of 20,000l. a year, can frequently provide for the payment, by increased œconomy in his expenditure ; and if he is even obliged to diminish his expences, he only debars himself of luxuries ; while the man of 500l. a year, can meet the difficulty, only by denying himself the comforts, and perhaps, abridging his family of the necessaries of life.

This tax is also unequal in the manner in which it affects different individuals of the same class. If a tax is to be imposed on income, it must be on the idea, that income is the evidence of property. Let two men draw each 1,000l. a year, one from the long annuities, the other from the short annuities ; their incomes will be the same ; and if they are obliged to relieve themselves by swearing to their respective incomes, each will pay 100l. yet they have manifestly different portions of property ; the annuity of one being worth twelve years purchase, while the annuity of the other is only worth six years purchase ; but equal burthens on unequal portions of property is unjust. There is the same injustice if the income is drawn from land, and one receives his income from land of which he is the proprietor in fee-simple and the other



other from land of which he is tenant for life. It is in like manner unjust, if one draws his income wholly from property, the other partly from property, partly from skill and industry. To this objection of inequality, I have heard but one answer attempted, viz. that taxes on consumption and property are also unequal.

Sir, the assertion is not true. Taxes on consumption are not unequal. Suppose three halfpence a pot is laid on porter: eighteen-pence on a bottle of port wine, and three shillings on a bottle of claret. It is true that every individual does not consume each of these articles in the same proportion; but, whoever does consume them, pays an equal tax. The tax on land does affect different individuals unequally. In the city of London a man pays four shillings in the pound, out of the rent for which he lets his house; while, in Northumberland, he pays but fourpence; this is unequal, and therefore unjust; and this manifest injustice has been one of the reasons which have induced the nation to prefer taxes on consumption, to an extension of the tax on landed property. This inequality in the land tax, is occasioned by the assessment under which the land tax is collected, having been made in the middle of the last century, while the country was under the authority of the long  
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parliament \*. At that time, the northern counties were thinly peopled, and ill-cultivated ; nor were the mines, which have since poured such abundance of wealth into those counties, at that time discovered. They had, for many centuries, been a sort of debatable land, between England and Scotland, always liable to the incursions of the Scots ; and though this circumstance had been in some measure altered after the accession of James the 1st. to the throne of England, yet there had not been time for those counties to reach the same degree of prosperity, as had been attained to in the South. But if there is any weight in this answer, it amounts to this ; viz. that it is not necessary to attend to equality in taxation ; and that it is no objection to a tax, that it will affect different classes of society, and different individuals in the same class unequally. Is it possible that any man can mean to contend for this ?

The next objection which has been taken, is, that by compelling the higher orders of the middle class to lessen their expences the employment of the artizan, will be destroyed ; and the revenue diminished by the taxes on consumption being rendered less productive. To this, some answer

\* The Parliament, in the reign of king William, adopted (with very little alteration) the assessment which had been used by the Long Parliament.

has been attempted ; the Chancellor of the Exchequer says, that he has relieved the lower orders, by diminishing the direct tax on them. As far as the relief granted to the lower orders will occasion less money to be raised, I acknowledge the modification to be beneficial ; it is *pro tanto*, an abandonment of the bill, but as far as an additional burthen is laid on the higher orders of the middle class, I think the modification not beneficial.

The mischief arising from this tax is, that the *direct* pressure on the higher orders of the middle class, will occasion an indirect pressure on the lower orders ; viz. by diminishing their employment ; now this mischief is increased by increasing the direct pressure on the higher orders of the middle class. I deny, therefore, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has spared the lower orders ; he destroys the life of the poor man, when he takes away the employment by which he lives. But the Chancellor of the Exchequer says, that the money will not be hoarded ; that it will be expended, and afford employment ; it is true, it will be expended, and afford employment ; but to whom ?—to soldiers and sailors. The Chancellor of the Exchequer tells the artizan, You have hitherto been entitled from the usage, and customs, and habits of society, to expect employment, but you cannot now have it ; the money  
which



which used to feed you, must now feed others; you must seek other employments, or emigrate, or go to the parish. Is there not a degree of inhumanity in this language? But the revenue will not suffer.—Yes, Sir; it will suffer. The same money spent by soldiers and sailors will not yield the same revenue from the consumption of taxable commodities, as it would if spent by artisans.

The next objection which has been taken is, that if income is to be made the standard of taxation, you must consent to the means necessary for investigating income. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has resorted to the assessed taxes as the criterion of income; but he has acknowledged that this is an incorrect criterion. He has, therefore, assisted this criterion by the declaration of the party on oath, where the amount of the sum demanded, under the present bill, exceeds one tenth of his income. The first objection to this assistant criterion is, that though it may relieve the man of the middle class, if assessed beyond one tenth, yet it will not compel the great land-proprietor, if taxed less than one tenth, to pay more. But if this declaration on oath is to be resorted to, mark the consequences. If a man swears falsely, is he punishable or not punishable? Take it either way; say that he is punishable; but punishment must be preceded by conviction; conviction by trial;

trial ; trial must involve enquiry and investigation. Are you prepared to subject every man to this investigation into his most secret concerns ? Yet this must be the case if he is indicted for having given a false account of his income. That a man should be subjected to such a disclosure of his most secret concerns, in my opinion, is not consistent, either with the principles of a commercial nation, or with those of civil liberty, or even with domestic happiness. By whom may the prosecution be preferred ? By any man, or only by the Attorney General ? If any man may institute the prosecution, every man who ventures to take this oath, is at the mercy of his enemy ; for if indicted for perjury, though acquitted, his character will be stained. Is the Attorney General alone to prosecute ? Whom will the minister find to hold the office of Attorney General ? If you say, that the man who swears falsely is not punishable, to what a situation is the country reduced, when you acknowledge that the only means by which the revenue can be collected, is the oath of the party ; but that if he swears falsely, he is not to be punished.—But it has been said, “ This measure will intimidate our “ enemies ; ”—What is there in this measure which can intimidate our enemies ? The Chancellor of the Exchequer states, that the funding system has been carried to its utmost extent ; that the augmentation of taxes on consumption

sumption is not expedient ; that recourse must be had to a new mode of taxation ; viz. by making income the standard of taxation, that it is true, that he has not yet discovered any correct criterion for investigating income ; that he admits the criterion proposed ; viz. the assessed taxes to be in many cases unequal, and therefore unjust ; that it will destroy the employment of the artisan, that it will diminish the present revenue arising from taxes on consumption ; and by so doing, weaken the security of the stock-holder, whose dividends are to be paid out of this revenue, and lastly, that it must be assisted by the establishment of an inquisitorial tribunal, inconsistent with civil liberty and private happiness. Is this the picture which will terrify our enemies ?

But supply is necessary. Be it so ; but not by these means. If supply is necessary, is it not the duty of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to propose such means of raising it as are consistent with justice, with the happiness of the subject, and the prosperity of the nation ? Is it sufficient for him to say, I want money ; therefore it must be had by any means, however unjust, or however injurious to the state ? Yet this is the mode of reasoning, adopted by the greater part of the partizans of the Minister. Supply may be necessary, but there may be better means of raising it, than that proposed



posed by this bill. I think a loan, with taxes imposed for the payment of the interest of that loan, would be a better mode. The question for our present consideration is not, whether it would have been better for this country, never to have adopted the funding system ; but whether it is for the benefit of the country, at the present moment, to abandon it. The funding system has produced much evil and some good. It has given birth to all our political wars ; (a dreadful scourge !) I think it would have been better for this country, if it had never been adopted. But it does not follow that it ought now to be abandoned. Nine parts in ten of our revenue are, at this time, received from taxes on consumption. Adopt the mode proposed, of a requisition on income, and the taxes on consumption will infallibly become less productive. It will be idle to augment the taxes on consumption, when those already established are annually decreasing in their produce. When you have once established the proposed mode of taxation, you must persevere in it.

This year you demand a contribution of a tenth of the income ; next year you will demand another tenth, and in proportion as you increase the requisition, the taxes on consumption will be less productive. You will raise five millions by this bill. Be it so ; but you will not add five millions to your revenue ; for you will have destroyed  
a portion

a portion of your present revenue, by diminishing the produce of the present taxes. I said, on a former night, that this was a new mode of taxation; and, I believe, I was right. The poll-tax was not a tax on income, but on rank and degree. It was an unjust tax, because it assumed as a principle, that all men of equal degrees had equal fortunes, and could therefore afford to pay the same tax. The principle was false, and the conclusion, therefore was unjust. But we have for many years wisely abandoned the idea of raising money by poll-taxes; and, I presume the Chancellor of the Exchequer cannot mean to recommend his present plan by suggesting that it bears a resemblance to a poll-tax. But if you cannot borrow, what must be done? Sir, you can borrow, if you can augment your revenue by additional permanent taxes on consumption; and if you cannot augment your revenue by this mode, you will not augment it by a requisition. Our ancestors imposed taxes on property; their more sagacious descendants preferred taxes on consumption.—Why? because they have found them more productive. There are many advantages attending this mode of taxation. In the first place, every individual in some measure imposes the tax on himself, and suits it to his own ability. If a tax of one shilling a bottle is imposed on Port Wine, every man has his choice to use it, or to abstain from it, and he determines, according to his ability, to pay.

There

There is another advantage ; this mode of taxation acts as a stimulant to industry : every man becomes more industrious, that he may furnish himself with the means of meeting the increased price of the commodity he wishes to purchase. But, it is said, it will be highly injurious to the nation, to sell 100l. 3 per cent. stock, for 45l. I admit it.—Our being obliged to procure money on these disadvantageous terms, is most sincerely to be lamented. But it is the consequence of the folly, the incapacity, and the profusion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He appears not to have known, that there are certain limits to the supply of money, as well as to that of every other commodity. And that if you demand more of any commodity than the market can conveniently furnish, it necessarily rises in price.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer has created half our national debt since the commencement of this war. In the last year he added 2,629,000l. to the dividends, payable by the public. If the principal had been all borrowed in a 3 per cent. stock, it would have amounted to 87,500,000l. 3 per cents. Can we wonder that the money market is drained? and that no money is to be obtained but on exorbitant terms? But the Minister had so little conceived, it possible, that the money-market could ever be exhausted, that he  
offered



offered the use of our market to the Emperor ; and suffered him to make a loan of six millions, the interest of which we shall have the satisfaction to pay.

If you ask, why the nation must give this enormous price for money ? the answer is obvious. Because the Chancellor of the Exchequer has been boundlessly profuse ; because to enable him to support his profusion, he has borrowed more, than the money market could conveniently supply ; and because a confiding majority permitted him to make whatever loans he pleased.

Sir, the difficulty of making a loan, arises from the past profusion of the Minister. What is the remedy he now proposes ? why truly, that having exhausted our credit, we should take money by requisition. A method which will infallibly destroy our revenue, throw our people out of employ, and leave us in a worse plight than we are at present. Whatever the inconvenience may be, we must continue the funding system, and endeavour to augment our revenue by additional permanent taxes on consumption. This will be less injurious than the requisition now proposed.

Another doubt which presents itself is, whether this money can be raised ? I acknowledge this objection to be considerably diminished  
by

by the modifications which the bill has undergone in the committee.

It will be more easy to raise five millions than seven millions; the money also will be more easily collected from the direct pressure on the lower orders being lightened.—Yet instances may be pointed out, where the payment will be extremely oppressive. Put the case of a clergyman deriving his income from corn-tythes; that he dies in the end of June before the corn is reaped;—he has lived nine months of the year, perhaps, contracting debts for his subsistence, and relying that the money which he expects to receive at Michaelmas will discharge all his expences for the preceding year; by his death, his life-hold interest is determined; his executors are entitled to no part of the corn tythes for the year, in which he died; his family find themselves bereft of that income which maintained them: loaded with debt for nine months subsistence; called on, perhaps, for a sum of money for dilapidations, and an additional demand for one year's contribution under the present bill. Is it not possible that in this case the contribution may not be obtained? Other cases might be put of equal hardship. But suppose the general voice of the people to be against the measure? What difficulties must occur if you enforce it?

And

And in what a situation do you place the country if you then find it necessary to abandon the experiment? But is the supply necessary? I have doubts on that question. Is the continuance of the war necessary? I doubt it. I cannot say that the continuance of the war is necessary, except I see that sincere endeavours have been in vain employed to obtain peace.

I do not think that sincere endeavours have been employed by his Majesty's Ministers to obtain peace. There is one circumstance in the papers on the table, which must strike every one; viz. That after the French Directory had intimated that the choice of Lord Malmesbury was not acceptable to them, yet our ministers persevered in that choice. I have been assured, by those who are conversant in diplomatic subjects, that this is a conduct unexampled in diplomatic history.

But other circumstances lead me to doubt the sincerity of his Majesty's Ministers: some of them never can have been sincere, except they have abandoned those principles, which first induced them to involve us in the war. I do not believe they have abandoned those principles. I recollect the language of the Secretary at War, on a former night; viz. That if peace brought  
reform,



reform, that reform he should consider as a revolution. As a loyal subject, the right honourable secretary cannot wish a revolution; and if he thinks reform synonymous with revolution, he cannot wish for that peace, which he, and all men, see must necessarily produce reform. Some of those who are now in his Majesty's cabinet, have involved this country in war, not from a dread of the power of France, but from jealousy of the Commons of England. They fear that the Commons of England may be influenced by the example of France to claim their rights. To claim, That no Peer should interfere in the election of a member of the House of Commons; that every member in this house should sit by the election of a body of the commonalty; and that this house should become, what the law has directed it to be; viz. The virtual representative of all the Commons of England. This is a ground of terror to Peers, proprietors of boroughs. And there are some among his Majesty's Ministers who are infected with this fear.

*The Speaker* called Mr. Nicholls to order, he said, he had not interrupted the honourable gentleman, while his argument went to shew that the present bill was improper or unnecessary. The latter part of his speech had certainly no reference to that point.

*Mr. Nicholls.* Sir, I bow with reverence to your authority ; but I hope I may be permitted to observe, that in considering a tax bill, it has been usual to allow great latitude of discussion. In this case our constituents cannot themselves apply directly by petition to this house. Their interests can only be protected by the exertions of their representatives. This was the line of argument I was endeavouring to follow ;—I oppose the tax, because not necessary ; I think the tax not necessary, because I think the continuance of the war not necessary ; I think the continuance of the war not necessary, because sincere endeavours have never yet been in vain employed to obtain peace. Why do I say that sincere endeavours have never yet been in vain employed to obtain peace ? Because some among his Majesty's Ministers, never can have employed sincere endeavours to obtain peace, except they have relinquished those principles on which they involved us in the war ; and if I may argue from the language of the Secretary at War, on a former night, when this Bill was under consideration, they have not abandoned those principles.

*The Speaker.* The honourable gentleman has a right to arraign the conduct of Ministers. I should not have called him to order, if he had confined his line of argument to that point.—  
(Here

(Here several members called out, Go on, go on ; the Speaker *said* you are in order.)

*Mr. Nicholls*, Sir, I have, on a former night, asserted, that Peers interfere in the election of members of this house ; I have declared my opinion that such interference is a violation of the law ; and I have expressed my wishes that such interference might be prevented in future. What answer have I received from the Chancellor of the Exchequer ? he does not deny my assertion of fact ; he does not deny my position of law ; but he says, If you wish to prevent Peers from interfering in the election of members of the House of Commons, it follows as a consequence, that you are ready to join the French when they invade this country. This is his logic. The Right Honourable Secretary at War argues more fairly ; he admits my assertion of fact, but he denies my position of law ; he says, the country is to be governed by a House of Commons, any number of whose members may hold their seats by the nomination of Peers ; and that this is the law of the land.

*The Speaker* again called to order ; he said that this had no reference to the question, which was, whether the bill should be read a third time.

*Mr.*



*Mr. Nicholls.* Sir, in submission to your authority, I shall desist from this line of argument. Sir, there is another ground on which as a member of this house, I feel it to be my duty to hesitate, before I assent to the proposed tax, viz. a doubt, whether even supposing the continuance of the war to be necessary, and that we must now contend for our existence, whether even in that case it is expedient to trust the money to the disposal of the present Minister. And whether it is not our duty to suspend the vote of the supply, and address his Majesty to remove his Ministers. Sir, every event of this war has convinced me, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, is a man of no abilities. (*here a laugh from the Ministerial benches.*) I will explain what I mean: I mean that he has no abilities to benefit his country. I have no wish to do injustice to the reputation of the Chancellor of the Exchequer: I acknowledge his talents as a debater in this house, that he possesses sarcasm, sneer, irony, wit; above all, he possesses the happy talent of multiplying and stringing together his words, in such a manner that it is hardly possible to affix a precise meaning to his language. To this he joins a most successful knack of misrepresenting the arguments of his adversaries. I acknowledge that he has much dexterity in cheering the band of prætorians who sit round him, and who are ready to laugh whenever he  
ever

gives the signal by a smile, in one word, I acknowledge that he is *maximus* as a political gladiator in this arenâ, while he is *minimus* as a Statesman.

If all which is required from a Minister, is the faculty of amusing this House by his speeches, I acknowledge his talents. But I recollect the expression of an Athenian statesman, Themistocles, he said, he could not play on a fiddle, but he could make a little city a great state. The language of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, must be the reverse of this; he can play on his fiddle, and amuse his confiding majority in this House; but he has reduced a great empire to be a little state. You judge of a painter, of a statuary, of an architect, by their respective works. I have read of an architect, who desired to be buried in a church which he had himself erected, with this epitaph, *Si quæris monumentum circumspice*. Would the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with his character as a statesman to be decided by this test? Is he an able war-minister? Is he a skilful financier? Is he a successful negotiator? Has he any one quality which constitutes the great statesman? His friends acknowledge that he is not an able war-minister; and how can they avoid making this acknowledgment? Beginning the war with all the powers of Europe on his side, he has so conducted it, that every ally has either abandoned us, or been subdued; while  
France

France has been exalted to a power almost beyond the dreams of ambition. View him as a financier;—the funding system exhausted by his folly in supposing that there were no limits to the supply which the money-market could afford; a paper-money established, taxes on consumption no longer practicable, while recourse is to be had to a requisition on income, though he himself acknowledges, that this requisition will be unequal, and therefore unjust; that it will destroy the employment of the artizan, diminish the present revenue, and, by so doing, weaken the security of the stockholder. That he has, as yet, discovered no criterion for ascertaining income; and that he is under the necessity of having recourse to the establishment of an inquisitorial tribunal, inconsistent with the principles of civil liberty, repugnant to every maxim of a commercial nation, and destructive of all private happinesses.

What is he as a negociator? He tells you himself that he has three times attempted to make peace; always he says sincerely, but always unsuccessfully. View him as a statesman; begin your examination of his conduct with the commencement of the French revolution, in the autumn 1789, when the King was carried prisoner to Paris. Sir, a great statesman would have seen, that this was a moment of no little consequence to



to England. He would have seen, that the French government was in a state of dissolution; incapable of resisting any pacific plans of the British Minister; and that he had it in his power to carry into effect many measures beneficial to his country. What was the conduct of the Chancellor of the Exchequer? His first measure was a foolish dispute with Spain; ill-conducted, and disgracefully terminated. He wanted the wisdom to see, that this was the happy moment when Great Britain might have re-established her antient connection with Spain, which had been interrupted by the accession of a Prince of the House of Bourbon to the throne of Spain. The alliance between France and Spain had been the alliance of the reigning families, not of the two nations; it would have been easy for him to have pointed out to the court of Spain, that the Bourbons being dethroned in France, it was now for the interest of Spain to look to Great Britain, and to renew its ancient, natural, and national alliance with this country.

In the year following, another foolish contest with Russia. In 1792, Austria and Prussia invaded France; he neither assisted the invaders, nor conciliated the confidence of France. In 1793, he engaged in the war; and how has he conducted it? one of his great political measures was the attempt to starve France; a measure which any  
man

man of the smallest reflection, must see would necessarily produce a famine in this country. If France was distressed for corn, and this country abounded, it was obvious that France would draw grain from this country by the assistance of the smuggler. While on the other hand, if both countries wanted corn, England would find France her competitor in every market where she might otherwise have hoped for supply.

But I will rest my opinion of him as as a statesman on his conduct in the late negociation: I mean after the 4th. of September, after his paltry intrigue to overturn the French government had failed. He knew that Austria would make a separate peace, if this country determined to continue the war; he knew that in consequence of that peace, France would establish her ascendancy in Italy, and the Mediterranean sea; and let it be remembered Sir, that this expression *the Mediterranean sea*, is of an import very different now, from what it was antecedent to the peace between France and Austria. All the Eastern part of the Mediterranean sea is now open to France; and the Grand Seignior is as much dependent on France for protection, as the Nabob of Oude is on the English government. He knew that from the moment peace was concluded between France and Austria, Portugal and Germany, as well as Spain and Holland,

Holland, would stand in awe of the power of France. He knew the situation of Ireland; he knew that he had exhausted the funding system; that he had been obliged to have recourse to that perilous measure, *paper money*; that he could no longer lay taxes on consumption, and that he must have recourse to this new mode, of a requisition on income; yet knowing all this, he wanted the political wisdom to see that this country ought to make peace in conjunction with Austria. That if this country was the last to relinquish the war, it would make peace on the most disadvantageous terms; and he determined to expose this country to all the hazards consequent on the continuance of the war, in hopes of retaining Trinidad, the Cape of Good Hope, and Trincomale.

Sir, it has been said by an honourable Alderman on a former night, that though the bill is odious, yet those he converses with, fear nothing so much as the removal of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It is very possible that this is true. Those who profit by the wasteful expenditure of public money, can never find a Minister more suited to their wishes. But can any man say, that he confides in the Chancellor of the Exchequer from a review of his conduct? Sir, When the Chancellor of the Exchequer was first advanced to power, it is not surprising that he



he was view'd with partiality ; we remembered his father's virtues, his talents, his services ; we easily believe what we wish, and we were willing to believe that the country would derive much benefit from the son's administration. We had observed, that in the father, the talents of the statesman had been accompanied by the powers of eloquence ; we admired the fluency with which the son addressed this house, and from his resemblance to his father in this faculty, we presumed that he resembled him in all the qualities of a Statesman. Sir, casual observers did not remark the difference between the father's eloquence and the son's. In the father, political wisdom was the ground-work ; eloquence the result ; he spoke forcibly, because he had reflected deeply. In the son, the knack of talking is the ground-work ; and he never has acquired political wisdom.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer affords a striking proof of the soundness of an opinion delivered by one who joined the qualities of the statesman to those of the orator. *Ac me quidem diù cogitantem, ratio ipsa in hanc potissimum sententiam ducit ; ut existimem, sapientiam sine eloquentiâ parum prodesse civitatibus : eloquentiam vero sine sapientia, nimium obesse plerumque, prodesse nunquam. Quare si quis, omissis studiis rationis et officii, consumit omnem operam*  
in

in exercitatione dicendi, inutilis sibi, patriæ perniciosus civis alitur\*.

Sir, we have instances that whole nations have been mistaken in the expectations they had formed of a statesman ; it is but a few years ago, that M. Neckar was considered as the tutelary angel of France ; there is now but one opinion of him ; viz. That he was a weak man, in whose character vanity was the leading feature. I do not mean to impute vanity to the Right Honourable Gentleman ; were I to mark the resemblance between him and M. Neckar, in the place of vanity, I should substitute arrogance ; perhaps the only natural quality which remains in that work of art, the present Chancellor of the Exchequer.

\* And I am fully convinced upon mature reflection, that political wisdom without eloquence, is not often useful to our country. But that eloquence without political wisdom, is most frequently injurious, never beneficial. If any man therefore, neglecting the pursuit of political wisdom, applies his whole attention to acquire the knack of talking, he becomes useless to himself, pernicious to his country.

F I N I S.





